December 11:

All events on December 11 will be held in Larsen Hall, 14 Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138.

8:30am:  Breakfast and Registration

9.30am:  Tutorials

             A. Budget Feasible Mechanisms (Larsen Hall 106)

             B. How, When, and Why to Conduct Online Behavioral Experiments (Larsen Hall G08)

11am:  Coffee Break

11.30am:  Tutorials

             A. Budget Feasible Mechanisms (Larsen Hall 106)

             B. How, When, and Why to Conduct Online Behavioral Experiments (Larsen Hall G08)

1pm:  Lunch

2.30pm:  Tutorials

             A. Price of Anarchy in Auctions (Larsen Hall 106)

             B. Computational Social Choice (Larsen Hall G08)

4pm:  Coffee Break

4.30pm:  Tutorials

             A. Price of Anarchy in Auctions (Larsen Hall 106)

             B. Computational Social Choice (Larsen Hall G08)

6pm:  End of Day

December 12:

All events, except the Poster Session and the Reception, on December 12 will be held in the Askwith Lecture Hall, in Longfellow Hall, 13 Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138.

The Poster Session and the Reception will be in Maxwell Dworkin lobby and 1st floor, 33 Oxford St., Cambridge, MA 02138. It is reachable by foot from the Longfellow Hall.

8:30am:  Breakfast and Registration

9.30am:  Invited Talk by Eva Tardos. Composable Mechanisms and Price of Anarchy in Auctions

Abstract: We consider auctions as games and we discuss how to analyze such games, and providing robust guarantees for their performance even when players participate in multiple  auctions, have valuations that are complex functions of multiple outcomes, and are using learning strategies to deal with an uncertain environment.

10.30am:  Coffee Break



11am:  Session 1 (Chair: Ian Kash)


11-11.24:  Daniel Russo and Nick Arnosti. Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews

11.24-11.48:  Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags. Mitigating Covert Compromises: A Game-Theoretic Model of Targeted and Non-Targeted Covert Attacks

11.48-12.12:  Stratis Ioannidis and Patrick Loiseau. Linear Regression as a Non-Cooperative Game

12.12-12.36:  Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz. Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?

12.36-1:  Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Milan Vojnovic. Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments

1pm:  Lunch

2.30pm:  Invited Talk by Dirk Bergemann. The Limits of Price Discrimination

Abstract: We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers’ tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out “third degree price discrimination”. We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer surplus is non-negative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the efficient gains from trade. As well as characterizing the welfare impact of price discrimination, we examine the limits of how prices and quantities can change under price discrimination. We also examine the limits of price discrimination in richer environments with quantitydiscrimination and limited ability to segment the market.

Joint work with Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris.

3.30pm:  Coffee Break

4pm:  Session 2 (Chair:  Vahab Mirrokni)

4-4.24:  Vincent Conitzer. The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

4.24-4.48:  Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani and Adrian Vetta. Polylogarithmic Supports are required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3

4.48-5.12:  Thomas Pradeau and Frédéric Meunier. A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem

5.12-5.45:  Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship

Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman. The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix

5.45pm:  Break

6.00pm:  Poster Session/Reception (Maxwell Dworkin lobby and 1st floor, 33 Oxford St., Cambridge, MA 02138)

9pm:  End of Day

December 13:

All events, except the conference banquet, on December 13 will be held in the Askwith Lecture Hall, in Longfellow Hall, 13 Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138.

The conference banquet is at Restaurant Marliave, 10 Bosworth St., Boston, MA 02108. It is reachable by subway from Harvard Square (take redline inbound to Park St. and about 5 minutes walk from Park St.)

8:30am:  Breakfast and Registration

9:20-9:30am:  Tie-Yan Liu, Microsoft Research Asia.  Announcement on WINE ’14



9:30am:  Session 3 (Chair:  Vincent Conitzer)

9.30-9.54:  Nishanth Dikkala and Eva Tardos. Can Credit Increase Revenue?

9.54-10.18:  Nitish Korula, Vahab Mirrokni and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality

10.18-10.42:  Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu and Tao Qin. Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising

10.42-11.06:  Bo Waggoner, Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian and Aranyak Mehta. Designing Markets for Daily Deals

11.06am:  Coffee Break



11:25am:  Session 4 (Chair:  David Kempe)

11.25-11.49:  Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz. The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem

11.49-12.13:  Mohammadhossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods

12.13-12.37:  Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger. Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions

12.37-1.01:  Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects

1.01pm:  Lunch



2:30pm:  Session 5 (Chair:  Shaddin Dughmi)

2.30-2.54:  Michal Feldman, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Brendan Lucier. Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions

2.54-3.18:  Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Auctions vs Negotiations in Irregular Markets

3.18-3.42:  Hadi Minooei and Chaitanya Swamy. Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players

3.42-4.06:  Jose R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses. The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited

4.06pm:  Coffee Break



4:25pm:  Session 6 (Chair:  Reshef Meir)

4.25-4.49:  Dimitris Fotakis and Emmanouil Zampetakis. Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design

4.49-5.13:  Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller and Ramamohan Paturi. Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching

5.13-5.37:  Pinyan Lu and Lan Yu. Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments

5.37-6.01:  Christoph Durr, Łukasz Jeż and Oscar Vásquez. Mechanism design for aggregating energy consumption and quality of service in speed scaling scheduling

6.01pm:  Break

7pm:  Banquet (Restaurant Marliave, 10 Bosworth St. Boston, MA 02108)

9pm:  End of Day

December 14:

All events on December 14 will be held in the Askwith Lecture Hall, in Longfellow Hall, 13 Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138.

8:30am:  Breakfast and Registration

9.30am:  Invited Talk by Joe Halpern.  Language-based Games.

Abstract: We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games that can also capture reference-dependent preferences. In language-based games, the domain of the utility function is extended to what we call situations: maximal sets of atisfiable formulas in some language. The role of the underlying language in this framework is thus particularly critical. By choosing the right language, we can capture psychological games [Geanakpolos, Pearce, and Stachetti] and reference-dependent preference [Koszegi and Rabin]. Of special interest are languages that can express only coarse beliefs (e.g., the probability of an event is “high” or “low”, rather than “the probability is .628”. Despite the expressive power of the approach, we show that it can describe games in a simple, natural way. Nash equilibrium and rationalizability are generalized to this setting; Nash equilibrium is shown not to exist in general, while the existence of rationalizable strategies is proved under mild conditions.

This represents joint work with Adam Bjorndahl and Rafael Pass.

10.30am:  Coffee Break



11am:  Session 7 (Chair:  Yaron Singer)

11-11.24:  Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas and Paul Spirakis. Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks

11.24-11.48:  Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner. Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games

11.48-12.12:  Xinran He and David Kempe. Price of Anarchy for the N-player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions

12:12-12.36:  Mona Rahn and Guido Schäfer. Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism Through Social Contribution Games

12:36-1:  Vittorio Bilo’, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli. On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games

1pm:  Lunch



2.10-2.30pm WINE Business Meeting

2.30pm:  Invited Talk by Ehud Kalai.  Learning and Stability in Large Games

Abstract: The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to modeling details of a game makes its predictions unreliable in many applications. In games with many players, however, Nash equilibria are robust and the modeling difficulties are less severe. Using a new concept of compressed Nash equilibrium, we discuss these properties in a general model that includes uncertainties about unknown fundamentals of nature and players’ types. Despite the failing of robustness in short interaction, aftersufficiently long play robustness is obtained.

Motivating examples include games played on the web and price stability in market games.

Joint work with Eran Shmaya.

3.30pm: Coffee Break



4pm:  Session 8 (Chair:  Brendan Lucier)

4-4.24: Tobias Harks and Philipp von Falkenhausen. Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox

4.24-4.48:  Yuan Tian. Strategy-proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting

4.48-5.12:  Rainer Boehme and Jens Grossklags. Trading Agent Kills Market Information: Evidence from Online Social Lending

5.12-5.36:  Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni. Exchange Markets: Strategy meets Supply-Awareness

5.36-6:  Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot and Lydia Tlilane. A protocol for cutting matroids like cakes

6pm:  End of Conference