Accepted Papers

(in the order they were submitted)

  • Mona Rahn and Guido Schäfer. Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism Through Social Contribution Games
  • Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani and Adrian Vetta. Polylogarithmic Supports are required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3
  • Tobias Harks and Philipp von Falkenhausen. Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
  • Pinyan Lu and Lan Yu. Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
  • Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz. Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?
  • Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas and Paul Spirakis. Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks
  • Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship
  • Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot and Lydia Tlilane. A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes
  • Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz. The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
  • Dimitris Fotakis and Emmanouil Zampetakis. Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design
  • Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman. The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix
  • Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger. Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
  • Xinran He and David Kempe. Price of Anarchy for the N-player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions
  • Yuan Tian. Strategy-proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting
  • Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni. Exchange Markets: Strategy meets Supply-Awareness
  • Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller and Ramamohan Paturi. Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching
  • Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
  • Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Milan Vojnovic. Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
  • Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
  • Daniel Russo and Nick Arnosti. Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews
  • Thomas Pradeau and Frédéric Meunier. A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem
  • Nishanth Dikkala and Eva Tardos. Can Credit Increase Revenue?
  • Vittorio Bilo’, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli. On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games
  • Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner. Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games
  • Christoph Durr, Łukasz Jeż and Oscar Vásquez. Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling
  • Mohammadhossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
  • Michal Feldman, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Brendan Lucier. Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
  • Nitish Korula, Vahab Mirrokni and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality
  • Vincent Conitzer. The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
  • Rainer Boehme and Jens Grossklags. Trading Agent Kills Market Information: Evidence from Online Social Lending
  • Stratis Ioannidis and Patrick Loiseau. Linear Regression as a Non-Cooperative Game
  • Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags. Mitigating Covert Compromises: A Game-Theoretic Model of Targeted and Non-Targeted Covert Attacks
  • Jose R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses. The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
  • Hadi Minooei and Chaitanya Swamy. Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players
  • Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu and Tao Qin. Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising
  • Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, and Bo Waggoner. Designing Markets for Daily Deals