#  Accepted Posters 

 



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## Accepted Posters

(in the order they were submitted)

- Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind and Jeffrey Rosenschein. **Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games over Interaction Networks.**
- Alon Noga, Dvir Falik, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz. **Bundling Attacks in Judgment Aggregation.**
- Hiroki Inoue, Yasuhiko Kato and Tomoya Sakagami. **International Airline Network Optimization using Evolutionary Computation.**
- Evan Pope and Mathew Holian. **Predicting Entry and Exit in Restaurant Markets Based on Yelp Reviews.**
- Haris Angelidakis, Dimitris Fotakis and Thanasis Lianeas. **Stochastic Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Players.**
- Victoria Rayskin. **Dynamics of Two-Sided Market.**
- Thomas Pradeau and Frédéric Meunier. **The uniqueness property for networks with several origin-destination pairs.**
- Can Kizilkale. **Cost Sharing of Multiple Non-excludable Public Goods.**
- Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill. **On the Tradeoff between Economic Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice.**
- Haris Aziz and Chun Ye. **Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations.**
- Luděk Cigler, Wolfgang Dvořák, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger. **Uniform Price Strategies to Exploit Positive Network Externalities.**
- Pascal Schoettle, Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags and Rainer Boehme. **A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Content-Adaptive Steganography with Independent Embedding.**
- Benjamin Lubin, Jesse Shore and Vatche Ishakian. **Communication Network Design: Balancing Modularity and Mixing via Optimal Graph Spectra.**
- Albert Xin Jiang, Thanh Nguyen, Milind Tambe and Ariel Procaccia. **Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution Against Boundedly Rational Followers.**
- Ryota Iijima. **Network Asymmetry.**
- Fei Fang, Albert Xin Jiang and Milind Tambe. **Optimal Patrol Strategy for Protecting Moving Targets with Multiple Mobile Resources.**
- Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy. **Prior Independent Auctions for Risk Averse Agents.**
- Hossein Azari Soufiani, David Parkes and Lirong Xia. **Statistical Decision Theory Approaches to Social Choice.**
- Emerson Melo. **Price Competition in Networked Markets of Complements and Substitutes.**
- Vincent Conitzer. **The Maximum Likelihood Approach to Voting on Social Networks.**
- Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang and Yiling Chen. **What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act — Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets.**
- Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Pascal Schoettle, Jens Grossklags and Rainer Boehme. **Managing the Weakest Link: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Thwart Insider Threats and Cyberespionage.**
- Yuqian Li and Vincent Conitzer. **Optimal Internet Auctions with Costly Communication.**
- Jung-Woo Sohn, Jens Grossklags, Anthony M. Kwasnica and John Yen. **How Do Traders Select a Market under Payoff-wise Equivalent Fee-charging Policies? A Game-model Analysis.**
- Thibaut Horel, Stratis Ioannidis and S Muthukrishnan. **Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design.**
- Munther Dahleh, John Tsitsiklis and Spyros Zoumpoulis. **The value of temporal data for learning of influence networks.**
- Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline. **Reverse Mechanism Design.**
- Cong Wei and Xuchao Lin. **Spread of Rumors in Social Networks.**
- Jens Witkowski and David Parkes. **A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations and Non-Binary Signals.**
- Rafael Frongillo and Ian Kash. **General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis.**
- Nooreddin Naghibolhosseini and Yaghub Farjami. **Intelligence Advertisements in RFID Enabled Cell phone.**
- Greg Stoddard. **Upvotes, Downvotes, and Initial Conditions: An Analysis of Reddit’s Curation Mechanism.**
- Garrett Andersen and Vincent Conitzer. **Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games.**
- Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy and Sam Taggart. **Interim Smoothness for Auction Welfare and Revenue.**