#  Accepted Papers 

 



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## Accepted Papers

(in the order they were submitted)

- Mona Rahn and Guido Schäfer. **Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism Through Social Contribution Games**
- Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani and Adrian Vetta. **Polylogarithmic Supports are required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3**
- Tobias Harks and Philipp von Falkenhausen. **Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox**
- Pinyan Lu and Lan Yu. **Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments**
- Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz. **Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?**
- Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas and Paul Spirakis. **Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks**
- Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill. **The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship**
- Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot and Lydia Tlilane. **A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes**
- Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz. **The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem**
- Dimitris Fotakis and Emmanouil Zampetakis. **Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design**
- Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman. **The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix**
- Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger. **Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions**
- Xinran He and David Kempe. **Price of Anarchy for the N-player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions**
- Yuan Tian. **Strategy-proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting**
- Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni. **Exchange Markets: Strategy meets Supply-Awareness**
- Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller and Ramamohan Paturi. **Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching**
- Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. **Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects**
- Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Milan Vojnovic. **Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments**
- Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis. **Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions**
- Daniel Russo and Nick Arnosti. **Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews**
- Thomas Pradeau and Frédéric Meunier. **A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem**
- Nishanth Dikkala and Eva Tardos. **Can Credit Increase Revenue?**
- Vittorio Bilo’, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli. **On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games**
- Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner. **Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games**
- Christoph Durr, Łukasz Jeż and Oscar Vásquez. **Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling**
- Mohammadhossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. **Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods**
- Michal Feldman, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Brendan Lucier. **Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions**
- Nitish Korula, Vahab Mirrokni and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. **Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality**
- Vincent Conitzer. **The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies**
- Rainer Boehme and Jens Grossklags. **Trading Agent Kills Market Information: Evidence from Online Social Lending**
- Stratis Ioannidis and Patrick Loiseau. **Linear Regression as a Non-Cooperative Game**
- Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags. **Mitigating Covert Compromises: A Game-Theoretic Model of Targeted and Non-Targeted Covert Attacks**
- Jose R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses. **The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited**
- Hadi Minooei and Chaitanya Swamy. **Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players**
- Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu and Tao Qin. **Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising**
- Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, and Bo Waggoner. **Designing Markets for Daily Deals**