Accepted Posters

(in the order they were submitted)

  • Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games over Interaction Networks.
  • Alon Noga, Dvir Falik, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz. Bundling Attacks in Judgment Aggregation.
  • Hiroki Inoue, Yasuhiko Kato and Tomoya Sakagami. International Airline Network Optimization using Evolutionary Computation.
  • Evan Pope and Mathew Holian. Predicting Entry and Exit in Restaurant Markets Based on Yelp Reviews.
  • Haris Angelidakis, Dimitris Fotakis and Thanasis Lianeas. Stochastic Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Players.
  • Victoria Rayskin. Dynamics of Two-Sided Market.
  • Thomas Pradeau and Frédéric Meunier. The uniqueness property for networks with several origin-destination pairs.
  • Can Kizilkale. Cost Sharing of Multiple Non-excludable Public Goods.
  • Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill. On the Tradeoff between Economic Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice.
  • Haris Aziz and Chun Ye. Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations.
  • Luděk Cigler, Wolfgang Dvořák, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger. Uniform Price Strategies to Exploit Positive Network Externalities.
  • Pascal Schoettle, Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags and Rainer Boehme. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Content-Adaptive Steganography with Independent Embedding.
  • Benjamin Lubin, Jesse Shore and Vatche Ishakian. Communication Network Design: Balancing Modularity and Mixing via Optimal Graph Spectra.
  • Albert Xin Jiang, Thanh Nguyen, Milind Tambe and Ariel Procaccia. Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution Against Boundedly Rational Followers.
  • Ryota Iijima. Network Asymmetry.
  • Fei Fang, Albert Xin Jiang and Milind Tambe. Optimal Patrol Strategy for Protecting Moving Targets with Multiple Mobile Resources.
  • Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy. Prior Independent Auctions for Risk Averse Agents.
  • Hossein Azari Soufiani, David Parkes and Lirong Xia. Statistical Decision Theory Approaches to Social Choice.
  • Emerson Melo. Price Competition in Networked Markets of Complements and Substitutes.
  • Vincent Conitzer. The Maximum Likelihood Approach to Voting on Social Networks.
  • Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang and Yiling Chen. What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act — Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets.
  • Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Pascal Schoettle, Jens Grossklags and Rainer Boehme. Managing the Weakest Link: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Thwart Insider Threats and Cyberespionage.
  • Yuqian Li and Vincent Conitzer. Optimal Internet Auctions with Costly Communication.
  • Jung-Woo Sohn, Jens Grossklags, Anthony M. Kwasnica and John Yen. How Do Traders Select a Market under Payoff-wise Equivalent Fee-charging Policies? A Game-model Analysis.
  • Thibaut Horel, Stratis Ioannidis and S Muthukrishnan. Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design.
  • Munther Dahleh, John Tsitsiklis and Spyros Zoumpoulis. The value of temporal data for learning of influence networks.
  •  Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline.  Reverse Mechanism Design.
  • Cong Wei and Xuchao Lin. Spread of Rumors in Social Networks.
  • Jens Witkowski and David Parkes. A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations and Non-Binary Signals.
  •  Rafael Frongillo and Ian Kash. General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis.
  • Nooreddin Naghibolhosseini and Yaghub Farjami. Intelligence Advertisements in RFID Enabled Cell phone.
  • Greg Stoddard. Upvotes, Downvotes, and Initial Conditions: An Analysis of Reddit’s Curation Mechanism.
  • Garrett Andersen and Vincent Conitzer. Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games.
  • Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy and Sam Taggart.  Interim Smoothness for Auction Welfare and Revenue.